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Professional and Ordinary Morality: 
A Reply to Freedman 
Mike W. Martin 
After rereading Freedman's original essay, I still find my earlier interpre- 
tations to be legitimate renderings of the essay. I must apologize, however, 
for not supplying the further exegesis warranted by his astute "Re- 
sponse." I want to use the allotted space for clarifying further the substan- 
tive issues over which we differ concerning the relationship between pro- 
fessional and ordinary morality. 
The following is a list of a few things that might be meant in 
drawing a distinction between professional and ordinary morality. They 
constitute only rough sketches of definitions based upon, respectively, de 
facto standards, the content of justified principles, the origin of justified 
principles, and professional status viewed as an act-permitting condition: 
(1) Professional morality consists of the standards endorsed by profession- 
als or professional societies. Ordinary morality is the set of standards 
people endorse in their nonprofessional, private lives. (2) Professional 
morality is the set of binding moral obligations to which professionals 
ought to be committed because of their special skills, functions, working 
milieu, etc. Ordinary morality is the set of valid moral considerations and 
morally correct judgments considered in abstraction from the special con- 
text of the professions and the specific moral obligations of professionals. 
(3) Ordinary morality in some sense 'emanates from' or has its origin (or 
justification?) in basic features of the human condition, whereas profes- 
sional morality derives from the special roles of professionals. (4) Profes- 
sional morality is a set of valid moral principles which sometimes 
requires acts that are immoral for anyone except persons having profes- 
sional status. Ordinary morality is the set of considerations which would 
make the acts immoral in the case of nonprofessional agents. 
We may set aside 1. In my earlier essay I ascribed 2 to Freedman, not 
3. In his "Response," Freedman- commits himself to the combination of 3 
and 4. Following Freedman's lead, I want to focus on 4. In his words, it 
"requires that professional morality call upon us to do acts (or to refrain 
from doing acts) whose omission (or performance) would be immoral, 
save for the fact of the actor's professional identity." Ordinary morality 
consists in what a person "would be obliged to do save for the fact of 
belonging to this profession." These are presented in the "Response" as 
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stipulative definitions, and not as substantive, argued-for, normative con- 
clusions. They make ordinary and professional morality logically incom- 
patible as a matter of definitional necessity. Using these definitions, it is 
plain that there are professional moralities, and there is, in particular, a 
medical-profession morality. For example, because I am not a doctor it is 
immoral for me to perform open-heart surgery, but it is permissible for 
cardiovascular surgeons to perform them, and this is because of their 
particular professional status. Again, as Freedman argued, there are some 
acts of maintaining confidentiality which are immoral for nondoctors but 
permissible for doctors. 
It is crucial to emphasize that these definitions leave open the ques- 
tion as to precisely why having a professional identity makes certain acts 
moral which would otherwise be immoral. For being a professional in- 
volves a complex of special properties, any one or several of which might 
be the morally decisive factor in a given case. Some of these properties 
may be grouped into the following categories: (a) ability set: possessing 
particular skills and expert knowledge; (b) function set: applying those 
skills and that knowledge in the course of performing designated func- 
tions within appropriate situations; (c) responsibility set: being charged 
with promoting a particular social good, and having special moral re- 
sponsibilities and obligations based upon both this good and the ways 
professional activities impact on moral rights; and (d) authorization set: 
being an official member of a profession, where a profession is a social 
institution granted unique privileges and legal rights by a society which 
desires professional zealousness. 
Freedman emphasizes d as the key factor which justifies a profession- 
al's individual actions. Granting the possible relevance of d, I would 
emphasize instead a through c. (It was primarily a and b which I had in 
mind in my earlier essay when I spoke of the "circumstances of medical 
practice.") Moreover, I would emphasize a through c in justifying both 
individual acts and institutional norms, thus invoking them at both of 
Freedman's "two tiers." What is important to keep clear is that this is a 
substantive normative issue left open by Freedman's definitions. He 
would be begging the question if he simply built into his definitions of 
"professional morality" that d is decisive. 
With this background, I want to make three comments. First, Freed- 
man's position is still open to the fundamental objection that an appeal 
to privilege-privilege based on social consent and society's desire for 
professional zealousness-is insufficient to justify morally (as opposed to 
legally) pledging oneself to professional norms and is also insufficient to 
justify those norms themselves. For the question of the moral reasonable- 
ness of society's consent and desires, all things considered, has to be ad- 
dressed. Here a through c-not d-are crucial, as well as are considera- 
tions from everyday morality. To use an extreme example, the mere fact 
that a society gave a Hitlerian authorization to doctors to fanatically 
pursue their dedication to health by conducting inhumane experiments 
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on Jews (in order to obtain new medical knowledge) would not suffice to 
justify the acts of those doctors. The unreasonableness of this society's 
desires and its institutional privilege thwarts the appeal to membership in 
the institution as a justification of individual acts. Similarly, authorized 
membership in the medical profession cannot by itself justify invoking 
the confidentiality privilege, for it needs to be justified in terms of a 
through c. And I believe it can be shown to be justified to a greater extent 
than can confidentiality in the more purely money-based relationships 
involved in Freedman's examples of the accountant and the city engineer. 
Second, Freedman's attack on deontological justifications for pledg- 
ing oneself to professional norms (which I viewed as an attack on deonto- 
logical justifications of professional norms) turns on equating "contra- 
vening ordinary morality" with "doing evil." Freedman maintains this 
view in his "Response": "At the point of entry into a privileged profes- 
sion the aspirant is engaged in a promise to do evil." But using the 
definition of "professional morality" given in his "Response," there is no 
basis for this claim. The aspirant is not promising to do evil, flat out, but 
only promising to do acts which would be immoral, save for the fact he 
will have professional identity at the time he performs them. Freedman 
says precisely this in his later elaboration of the (apparently contradict- 
ing) remark that the aspirant's pledge "is saved from being a promise to 
do evil." Since it is not really a promise to do evil, his earlier attack on 
deontological perspectives is vitiated. Trying to avoid this objection by 
inventing special senses of "evil," defined in terms of different moralities, 
is needlessly obfuscating. And the same can be said of his statement that 
what the aspirant is doing "is exchanging a moral point of view for 
another legitimate moral world." This heady talk, reminiscent of 
Nietzsche's leap beyond good and evil, is a misleading way of saying that 
the special features of the professional world are morally relevant in as- 
sessing a person's obligations. 
Finally, the importance of pursuing the appeal to rights, understood 
in deontological rather than utilitarian terms, seems to me all the more 
pressing given Freedman's concluding remarks in the "Response." He 
avers that the patient's right to privacy, and hence to confidentiality, is 
"created through a grant to the profession of privilege." There are 
grounds for concern here! The individual patient is placed in double 
jeopardy when his or her rights are treated as contingent upon a privilege 
granted by one social unit (a country) to another social unit (a profession). 
The moral right to privacy is not the offspring of a legal or institutional 
right; rather, the legal or institutional right should be established in order 
to insure protection of the moral right. 
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